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Abstract
Observational studies suggest that women’s income benefits children’s health and
nutritional status, as well as education, more than men’s income, apparently because women are
more likely to shift marginal resources to their children. These studies have influenced policies
such as conditional cash transfers, which typically target women. However, previous studies
have been unable to control for unobserved heterogeneity in child endowments and parental
preferences. We report the results of a trial that allocated randomly one-time in-kind income in
the form of edible rice (the main staple and cash crop in the study area) or rice seeds to the
female or male household head (edible rice transfers, range: 30-395 kg/household; rice seeds: 5.9
kg/household). The trial took place in a society of native Amazonian forager-farmers in Bolivia
(2008-2009). Outcomes included four anthropometric indicators of short-run nutritional status of
848 children from 40 villages. We found that the transfers produced no discernible impact on
short-run (~5 months) nutritional status of children, or any differential effects between girls and
boys by the gender of the household head who received the transfers. These null results probably
relate to specific social norms of the Tsimane’, such as pooling of food resources, shared
preferences, and relatively equal bargaining power between Tsimane’ women and men. The
results highlight the probable importance of culture in household resource allocation and suggest
that gender targeting in cash transfer programs might not increase investments in children in
societies where women and men have more egalitarian household relationships.
Keywords: Cash transfers | nutrition | gender | native Amazonians | randomized control trial
JEL code: D13, H31, I20
Summary of contents:
Text: 4,924 words (including abstract); Tables: 5; Figures: 2.
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1. Introduction
There is a widely-held belief that income in the hands of women benefits children more than
income in men’s hands, presumably from the socialization of women and from a biological predisposition of women to care and to shift marginal resources more toward young children
(Gettler, 2010; Trevathan, 2010). The belief finds support in observational studies (Behrman,
1997; Handa, 1996; Pfeiffer et al., 2001; Qian, 2008; Rogers, 1996; Smith et al., 2003), but such
studies do not permit firm conclusions about causality owing to endogeneity biases. Despite the
uncertainty surrounding the estimates, cash transfer programs typically transfer income to
women (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). To our knowledge there is no published evidence with
exogenous gendered-allocation of resources to support the belief that the well-being of young
children improves more when women rather than men receive income (Yoong et al., 2012).
Recent experimental studies provide indirect evidence that the conclusion might need
reappraisal. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) estimated the effects of having women leaders on
public investments in India. They found that communities with women leaders invested more in
water (which might improve child health), but some invested less in education (which might
erode child health). Braido et al. (2012) and Morris et al. (2004) used a natural experiment from
a conditional cash transfer program in Brazil to examine the effect of the transfer on women’s
bargaining power and child nutrition. Braido et al. (2012) found that women in households with
a male partner who received transfers had similar expenditure patterns to their peers in control
households, and Morris et al. (2004) found that children (<3 years old) of women who received
transfers had lower rates of weight gain than their peers in control households. A recent
evaluation of the PROGRESA (Oportunidades) program in Mexico found no difference in
women’s use of conditional and earned income (Handa et al., 2009). A randomized experiment
3

of cash transfers labeled for education in rural communities in Morocco found large gains in
child school participation, but it made essentially no difference to target transfers to female
rather than to male household heads (Benhassine et al., 2013). Finally, Gitter and Barham (2008)
found that conditional income transfers to women in Nicaragua increased child school
enrollment, but the effects declined if a women’s bargaining power far exceeded that of her male
partner.
Taken together, these studies suggest that exogenous improvements in women’s income
might not change consumption or improve child outcomes (or do so only under particular
conditions), but most do not allow to assess the comparative effects of gender-targeted income
transfers on child well-being because income was transferred only to women. To our knowledge,
only two randomized control trials (RCTs) allow assessing the comparative effects of gendertargeted transfers: a study in Morocco, which found no differential effects by recipients’ gender
(Benhassine et al., 2013), and a recent study in Burkina Faso where gender effects are still under
analysis (Akresh et al., 2013).
Here we present the results of a RCT in which we randomized the female or the male
household head to receive a one-time, unconditional in-kind transfer of income in the form of
edible rice, to assess whether gender targeting of unconditional cash transfer increase
investments in children. The trial took place in a foraging-farming society of native Amazonians
in Bolivia, the Tsimane’ (Saidi et al., 2012). The Tsimane’ were an attractive society for the RCT
because government conditional cash-transfer programs target populations with low monetary
income, like the Tsimane’, but have overlooked specific characteristics of the populations such
as the egalitarian social status of Tsimane’ men and women. Moreover, in recent years, the
Bolivian government has begun to implement similar types of cash transfer programs (e.g.,
4

Juancito Pinto, conditional on school attendance, Juana Azurduy, conditional on medical
checkups) which have reached marginalized communities, including the Tsimane’ (Undurraga et
al., 2013). While the Tsimane’ are still moderately engaged in the market economy and cash is of
limited use in the communities, such a setting allowed us to control for confounders that are
common in more industrialized societies. Rice is their most important staple and cash crop
(Vadez et al., 2004), a proxy for cash that is both fungible and consumable. The trial built on
continual ethnographic studies since 1995 and on a panel study (2002-2010) among the Tsimane’
of a nearby area (Leonard and Godoy, 2008). We assessed the impact of the transfers on four
anthropometric indicators of short-run nutritional status of children 2-9 years old about five
months after the transfers.

2. Background and study design
2.1 The Tsimane’
Tsimane’ live mostly along the Maniqui and the Apere rivers, in a relatively remote
corner of the Department of Beni (Huanca, 2008; Ringhofer, 2010). Missionaries and colonists
have brought market goods and employment opportunities, but most Tsimane’ remain highly
autarkic. A comparative study among 15 small-scale foraging and horticultural societies ranked
the Tsimane’ next to the lowest in market exposure, with an average of about 7% of total
household calories bought in the market (Henrich et al., 2010). About 40% of adults (≥ 16 years)
during 2002-2007 had earned no monetary income during the two months before the interview.
Tsimane’ earn monetary income through the sale of forest and farm goods, and through
occasional wage labor in logging camps or cattle ranches; but they have low levels of monetary
or non-monetary savings (Undurraga et al., 2013). In 2009, mean daily monetary income per
5

person reached US$0.90 (SD=2.1).
Depending on the age bracket, 33-40% of Tsimane’ children are growth-stunted, similar
to other native Amazonian societies (Foster et al., 2005; Godoy et al., 2010b; Orr et al., 2001).
Household-level analyses of food-use patterns suggest that the Tsimane’ diet is sufficient to meet
daily energy and protein requirements (Godoy et al., 2005), so the high levels of child stunting
probably reflects high infectious disease loads and marginal dietary quality rather than limited
food availability. Another explanation for the ubiquity of stunting may be related to modest
height premiums among adults as perceived by parents (Godoy et al., 2006a; Godoy et al.,
2010a; Undurraga et al., 2012). Other anthropometric measures also suggest that Tsimane’
children are not experiencing observable protein-energy malnutrition. Specifically, weight-forheight, body fatness, and indices of muscularity among Tsimane’ children all more closely
approximate age-specific and sex-specific reference values than height-for-age (Foster et al.,
2005). The average girl or boy in our sample was 0.33 standard deviations (SD) above their agespecific and sex-specific peers in the USA in weight-for-height measures, and only 1.2% of the
sample was wasted.1
Tsimane’ women are considerably empowered, although this does not seem obvious from
standard economic and human capital indicators. For example, women lag behind men in
monetary income, value of modern physical assets, and also in formal schooling, academic skills,
and fluency speaking Spanish (Godoy et al., 2006b). The value of modern assets (e.g., metal
tools) and monetary earnings of male household heads was 2.5 times larger than that of female
household heads at baseline (2008). Female household heads had 1.3 fewer grades of schooling
1

Children with low (≤ -2 standard deviations) height-for-age Z-scores were considered stunted and children with
low weight-for-height Z-scores were considered wasted; both measures indicate that children are nutritionally at
risk.
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attainment, a 30 percentage-point lower probability of speaking fluent Spanish, and lower formal
math skills than male household heads of the same age.
These disadvantages are partially offset by other indicators that relate to life away from
the market. Observational data suggests that women maintain social status equal to men within
community and home life. For example, female and male household heads did not differ in the
monetary value of physical assets owned made from local materials (e.g., canoes) or in the value
of their stock of domesticated animals (e.g., chickens). Additionally, female household heads in
this and in a previous study (Godoy et al., 2006b) had better average nutritional indicators, such
as higher age-standardized and sex-standardized Z-scores of muscle area, skinfolds, and weightfor-age than their male counterparts.
Although women and men own and keep physical assets separately, they pool resources
in farming, with all in the family often literally eating from a common pot. The practice of
preferential cross-cousin marriage plus matrilocal post-marital residence means that adult women
live in villages with close kin to provide support, which enhances perceived empowerment.
Several aspects of Tsimane’ life suggest gender equality in running the household. For example,
both women and men pool labor resources for agricultural production, and both have equal say in
food production. Men hunt, but women collect plants and produce chicha, a locally-fermented
beverage that contributes to social gatherings and, thus, to a household’s status in the village.

2.2 Experimental Design
Recent estimates suggest that Tsimane’ number ~14,200 and live in ~95 villages of at
least eight households each (Gran Consejo Tsimane', 2013). To select the 40 villages for the trial,
we excluded villages participating in other studies, too costly to reach, too small or unsafe, or
7

that contained other ethnic groups. This left 65 villages of which we selected 40 based on
accessibility (Figure 1). Only 4% of households in the sample were single-headed.
The random assignment of income transfers to female versus male household heads was
part of a trial to estimate the effects of unconditional income transfers on adult and child health
in 40 Tsimane’ villages. The trial had two treatment groups that received edible rice – one
treatment included transfers to all households and in the other transfers was targeted at the
poorest 20% – and a control group that received improved rice seeds (Figure 2). The baseline
survey happened during February-May, 2008, the transfers happened during October 2008January 2009, and the follow-up survey happened during February-May 2009.

8

Figure 1. Tsimane’ villages in the panel study and randomized control trial (Beni, Bolivia)

Notes: The colors of the territory denote elevation; mamsl denotes meters above mean sea level. The square symbols
and letters in each town are approximately proportional in size to town population. [Color online, grayscale on print]

9

Figure 2. Summary of Experimental Design

Notes: HH denotes household. All households in T1 received rice transfers; only the households in
the bottom 20% of the village income distribution in T2 received income transfers, and the top 80%
received rice seeds; all households in the control group received rice seeds. The recipient of the
transfers was chosen at random between the male and female household head in all groups. The
households by treatment arm and the total households shown in the figure include only households
that had children between 2 and 9 years old, and that were present during the baseline and follow-up
of the trial. The complete trial included 494 HH; 153 HH in T1, 176 HH in T2, and 165 in the
control group.

Treatment 1 (T1): Each of the 13 villages received a total of 782 kg of edible rice, which
was divided equally among all households of the village. Hence, the amount of rice per person
varied within and across villages for two reasons. First, the amount of edible rice received by
each household was inversely related to the number of households in a village (mean: 58 kg;
median: 52 kg; SD: 23 kg; range 30-131 kg). Second, the amount of rice per person varied
further by household size.
10

Treatment 2 (T2): Thirteen villages received the same aggregate amount of edible rice as
in T1 (782 kg), but the transfers were targeted only to households in the bottom 20% of the
village income distribution (mean: 177 kg; median: 157 kg; SD: 81 kg; range 98-395 kg). Not
surprisingly –considering the limited sample of villages for the trial– the quantity of edible rice
transferred to households in T2 was only about three times larger than in T1 (as opposed to five
times larger) since the village population distribution of the two treatments was not identical.
We used the area of old and fallow forest cleared by households (per person) at baseline
to identify the poorest 20% of households in a village (Behrman et al. 2011). Each year
households clear forests to plant annual and perennial crops. Forest area cleared is a reasonable
proxy for annual income because all farm output from cleared plots is consumed, sold, or
bartered, thus capturing household total annual consumptions and monetary income from farm
products. But area of forest cleared does not include occasional income from wage labor or from
the sale of forest products.
Controls: Control households included all households in the 14 villages that were not part
of T1 or T2. Households in the top 80% of the village income distribution of villages receiving T2
received the same transfer as controls, but were analyzed as a separate group. All households in
the control group received 5.9 kg of rice seeds.
Random gender-targeting in the delivery of transfers: All transfers were randomly
assigned to the female or to male household head; however, not all them were present during the
transfers to directly receive the rice from us (present: treatment=62%, control=52%; χ2= 4.5,
p=0.03). If the female or male household head selected was missing, we gave the transfer to a
third party (e.g., teacher) and asked the person to give the transfer to the absent household head
when the head returned to the village. In the robustness analysis we exclude third-party
11

recipients.

2.3 Significance of the transfers
We used rice rather than money because of the limited use of money in remote villages
and because of the importance of rice as a staple and as a cash crop (Vadez et al., 2004). Total
monetary expenditures on all foods did not change due to the rice transfers, suggesting that the
transfers did not displace other foods.
The transfers of rice amounted to ~US$11/person for people in villages receiving T1 and
to ~US$ 33/person for people in the bottom 20% of the income distribution in villages receiving
T2. The transfers amounted to income earned over 12.4 days (T1) or 36.5 days (T2) for an average
Tsimane’. Annual panel data (2002-2007) suggests that mean weekly rice consumption per
person was ~1 kg, so expressed in terms of rice consumption and assuming a household had six
people –the average for the sample– a person in either T1 or T2 would have had enough rice for
10 weeks (T1) or 30 weeks (T2).
The monetary value of the rice seeds given to control households was US$ 1.7/person,
but the perceived value of the improved rice seeds at delivery time may have been lower, as there
is no market for improved rice seeds in the study area and Tsimane’ reported they did not like the
harvested rice from improved seeds in focus groups and interviews following the study
(February 2011).
From a nutritional perspective, the rice transfers represented a substantial infusion of
energy and protein (Table 1). Assuming 10% wastage over five months (150 days), the 58 kg
transfers would have added 1,249 kcal/day and 25 g/day of protein to average household
availabilities. For the 177 kg transfers, the daily increases would have been 3,813 kcal of energy
12

and 75 grams of protein. Considering the nutritional needs of an average Tsimane’ child (Table
1) even a small allocation of the household rice allotment would have important nutritional
implications for Tsimane’ children. Indeed, for the 58 kg rice transfers, a 10% allocation to a
five-year old child would meet ~10% of the child’s daily energy requirements and 16-17% of
daily protein needs. For the large rice transfers (177 kg) of T2, a 10% allocation accounts for
~30% of the energy requirements and half of the protein needs of a 5.5 year old Tsimane’ child.
The WHO recommends that an increase of ~3-4% in dietary energy consumption is necessary for
‘catch up’ growth in body weight for a child of this age (FAO/WHO/UNU, 2004).

Table 1. Nutritional significance of rice transfers for household energy and protein availability
58 kg rice Transfer
Energy (kcal)

177 kg rice Transfer

Protein (g)

Energy (kcal)

Protein (g)

208,220

4,118

635,430

12,567

Daily increase
(household/day)a

1,249

25

3,813

75

Boy’s daily needsb

1,281

15

1,281

15

Percent of needs (10% rice
allocation)

9.8%

17.0%

29.8%

50.0%

Girl’s daily needsb

1,165

14

1,165

14

10.7%

17.9%

32.7%

53.6%

Total infusion

Percent of needs (10% rice
allocation)

Notes: a Daily increase calculated over 150 days of consumption, assuming 10% wastage. b Estimates based on
WHO energy and protein requirements (FAO/WHO/UNU, 2004; WHO, 2007) for an average Tsimane’ boy and
girl of 5.5 years of age (boy: 17.2 kg; girl: 16.3 kg)
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2.4 Methods: Anthropometric data and analysis
We collected children’s anthropometric data following Lohman et al.’s (1988) protocol.
Linear growth (stature/length) was measured to the nearest millimeter using a portable
stadiometer. Body weight was measured to the nearest 0.2 kg using a standing scale. We
measured mid upper-arm circumference (MUAC) to the nearest millimeter using a plastic tape
measure and triceps skinfold thickness (TST) to the nearest 0.5 mm using Lange skinfold
calipers. From raw anthropometric measures, we calculated two additional indices: weight-forheight Z-score (WHZ) and arm muscle area (AMA). WHZ values were calculated relative to the
WHO (1995, 2006) reference values. We followed the procedure of Frisancho (1990) to
calculate AMA (cm2) from MUAC and TST measures.
Weight-for-Height Z-score (WHZ) was used to assess wasting and mortality risk. Because
the growth velocities of children in both weight and stature depend on age, changes in weightfor-height were assessed as Z-scores. Z-scores capture the difference between the measured
value of the Tsimane’ child’s weight-for-height and the median value of the reference population
for weight-for-height at the same sex and age, divided by the standard deviation of the reference
population for that nutritional indicator. Low values of WHZ reflect acute energy deficiency;
children with WHZ scores ≤–2.0 are classified as wasted.
Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) measures the diameter of the upper arm and
assesses both fat storage (source of energy) and muscle mass (source of protein or amino acids).
Fat and muscle mass are energy reserves for vital functions during infection. MUAC can predict
mortality among young children independent of WHZ and other weight-based or height-based
measures (Berkley et al., 2005; Briend et al., 1989; Van den Broeck et al., 1998). MUAC is a
14

stronger predictor of early childhood mortality than either height-based or weight-based
anthropometric indices (deOnis et al., 1997; Trowbridge and Sommer, 1981).
Arm-Muscle Area (AMA) captures muscular development and protein reserve (Saito et
al., 2010). Consequently, as with low WHZ, low AMA is indicative of protein-energy
malnutrition.
Triceps Skinfold Thickness (TST) measures the thickness of subcutaneous adipose tissue
and captures total body fat and energy reserves (Jebb et al., 1993; Pecoraro et al., 2003). High fat
content is associated with high calorie intake or low energy expenditure (Frisancho, 1990). Fat
assessment has an added advantage because fat remains stable among children 1-7 years of age
(Gurney, 1969). The use of muscle and fat measures was of primary interest because these
dimensions are affected by nutritional disorders and can change in the short run (Briend et al.,
1989; Holliday, 1978).
We limited the analysis to children from 2 to 9 years old. We set the upper age bracket to
ensure puberty did not affect estimates of growth rates. Previous studies suggest that Tsimane’
children may enter pre-pubertal growth spurt as early as 10-12 years of age (Byron, 2003; Godoy
et al., 2010b). Tsimane’ mothers breastfeed their children for about two years, so including
children less than two years old would have increased age-related heterogeneity regarding the
possible consumption of rice by children. The final sample included 40 villages, 191 households,
and 848 children (girls=407, boys=441) (Table 2). The total baseline sample contained 959
children (girls=473; boys=486), but by the time of the follow-up survey 24 girls and 21 boys had
left (4.7% loss of the baseline sample).
We analyzed the pooled sample, and also divided the sample into four groups to take into
account that we transferred two resources (rice and seeds) and that treatment effects in T2 might
15

vary by the household’s position in the village income distribution (Saidi et al., 2012). The
groups included: (1) all households in T1, (2) all households in the 14 control villages, (3)
households in the bottom 20% of the village income distribution in T2, and (4) households in the
top 80% of the village income distribution in T2.
We estimated the effect of the income transfers to female or male household heads on
child nutritional status using a double-difference estimator, based on the following model for
each anthropometric outcome:

Yaihvt = α + βMaleThvt + γAfterihvt + δMaleT*Afterihvt + υXihvt + εaihvt (1)

Where the subscripts stand for anthropometric indicators (a), individual or child (i),
household (h), village (v), and year (t). MaleT is an indicator for treatment (1=recipient was a
man; 0=recipient was a woman); After is an indicator for time (0=2008 or baseline; 1=2009 or
follow up, after), MaleT*After is an interaction term, X is a vector of control variables (child age
and sex, and outcome at baseline), and ε is a disturbance term. The coefficient δ is the differencein-difference (DID) estimate for the effect of gender-targeting the transfer. We estimated
expression [1] for each of the four groups separately, and in some regressions we pooled the four
groups and add indicator variables for T1 and T2, to increase statistical power. We adjusted the
standard errors for clustering at the village level.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics at baseline (children 2-9 years old)
T1

T 2.

Control

(Rice)

Bot 20% Top 80%
(Rice) (Seeds)

(Seeds)

Sub-totals
T1+Bot 20%
T2 (Rice)

Total

Control+
Top 80%
T2 (Seeds)

(Both)

Children
Girls (N)

132

42

94

139

174

233

407

Boys (N)

124

45

108

164

169

272

441

9

4

15

17

13

32

45

Women (N)

23

14

23

28

37

51

88

Men (N)

38

7

23

35

45

58

103

Villages

13

Attrition (N)
Household winnera

13

14

40

Child attributes: mean (standard deviation)
Age

5.5 (2.2)

5.3 (2.2)

5.3 (2.3)

5.5 (2.2)

5.4 (2.2)

5.4 (2.3)

5.4 (2.2)

WHZ

0.4 (0.8)

0.3 (0.7)

0.2 (0.9)

0.3 (0.7)

0.4 (0.8)

0.3 (0.8)

0.3 (0.8)

AMA

16.1 (3.6)

15.2 (4.2) 15.9 (4.2)

16.4 (4.1)

15.9 (3.8)

16.2 (4.2)

16.1 (4.0)

MUAC

16.4 (1.7)

16.0 (1.8) 16.3 (1.8)

16.4 (1.7)

16.3 (1.7)

16.4 (1.8)

16.3 (1.7)

6.9 (1.9)

7.3 (2.4)

7.0 (2.2)

7.2 (2.3)

TST

7.3 (2.3)

7.3 (2.8)

7.2 (2.5)

Notes: aHousehold winner refers to household head who was selected to receive the transfer, even if absent at the
time of the transfer. T1, T2 denote treatment 1 and treatment 2.

3. Results
Tables 3 and 4 contain the parameter estimates for equation [1]. The most striking finding
in Tables 3 and 4 is the absence of almost any statistically significant result for the difference-indifference coefficient, whether we did the analysis with the four separate groups or pooled all
groups while controlling for T1 and T2.

17

Table 3. Difference-in-difference estimate of the effects of -targeted income transfers on child
anthropometric indicators of nutritional status, controlling for baseline outcomes (T1 and T2 villages)
T1
Explanatory

WHZ MUACb

variables:
DIDa
After
MaleT
Boy (child sex)
Age (child age)

-0.023

0.003

(0.124)

(0.011)

-0.073

0.013

(0.094)

(0.010)

-0.017

-0.000

(0.033)

(0.003)

-0.056

-0.007

(0.036)

(0.004)

0.021
(0.014)

Base outcome
Constant
Observations
2

R

c

T2: Bottom 20%
AMAb

TSFb

0.029

-0.064

-0.044

(0.030) (0.058)

(0.120)

0.016

TSFb

WHZ MUACb AMAb

TSFb

0.064

0.070

0.123

0.012

(0.025) (0.058)

(0.039)

(0.151)

0.017

-0.054

-0.088

(0.017) (0.056)

(0.076)

(0.133)

-0.029

-0.020

-0.105

(0.008) (0.017)

(0.022)

(0.056)

-0.043

-0.017

0.017

(0.010) (0.024)

(0.015)

(0.062)

0.024 0.012** 0.034**

-0.012

-0.007

(0.008)

(0.018)

0.027

-0.021

(0.023) (0.038)

(0.120)

-0.005

0.010

-0.028

(0.012) (0.009)

(0.054)

-0.011

-0.021

(0.012) (0.015)

0.007* 0.023**
(0.002)

WHZ MUACb AMAb

-0.004

(0.007) (0.004)

T2: Top 80%

0.040
-0.003
-0.014

0.002 -0.022*
(0.095)
(0.014)

(0.002) (0.005)

-0.016

-0.038

(0.022) (0.054) (0.048)
0.002

0.022

-0.044

(0.011) (0.029) (0.050)
-0.007

-0.012

-0.014

(0.006) (0.012) (0.023)
-0.012

-0.018

-0.042

(0.008) (0.014) (0.025)
0.009* 0.029**

-0.008

(0.004) (0.006) (0.004)

0.775** 0.765** 0.689** 0.745** 0.654** 0.664** 0.626** 0.725** 0.662** 0.678** 0.608** 0.654**
(0.054)

(0.101)

(0.102) (0.027)

(0.114)

(0.043) (0.035)

0.024

0.623*

0.737* 0.522**

(0.070)

(0.271)

(0.247) (0.063)

477

477

475

475

163

162

0.642

0.772

0.735

0.602

0.458

0.737

(0.030)

-0.014 0.884** 0.858** 0.610**
(0.105)

(0.118) (0.090)

(0.054)

(0.073) (0.056) (0.029)

0.156 0.857** 0.932** 0.736**

(0.063)

(0.125)

(0.192) (0.136) (0.079)

162

162

399

397

393

393

0.712

0.633

0.471

0.510

0.538

0.571

Notes: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, robust standard errors (in parentheses) were adjusted for clustering at the village level. DID
denotes difference in difference, T1 and T2 denotes treatment 1 and treatment 2. a DID=MaleT *After. b Outcomes in
natural logarithms. c Base outcome denotes the indicator of child nutritional status at baseline.
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Table 4. Difference-in-difference estimate of the effects of gender-targeted income transfers on
child anthropometric indicators of nutritional status, controlling for baseline outcomes (control
and pooled villages)
Control
Explanatory
variables:

WHZ MUACb

DIDa

Pooled

AMAb

TSFb

WHZ

MUACb

AMAb

TSFb

0.087
(0.132)
-0.150
(0.080)

-0.001
(0.010)
0.003
(0.012)

-0.023
(0.032)
0.009
(0.028)

0.058
(0.034)
-0.009
(0.027)

0.046
(0.069)
-0.096
(0.049)

0.001
(0.007)
0.005
(0.006)

-0.003
(0.021)
0.016
(0.017)

0.012
(0.026)
-0.014
(0.023)

MaleT

-0.017
(0.028)

-0.004
(0.003)

-0.007
(0.009)

-0.009
(0.010)

-0.037
(0.021)

-0.004
(0.002)

-0.010
(0.006)

-0.004
(0.007)

Boy (child sex)

0.013
0.001
0.010 -0.030*
(0.049) (0.002) (0.009)
(0.014)
0.028 0.009** 0.029** -0.011**

0.000
(0.030)
0.016

-0.007*
(0.003)
0.009**

-0.008
(0.007)
0.028**

-0.029**
(0.009)
-0.008**

(0.003)
0.670**

(0.009)
0.714**

(0.001)
0.722**

(0.003)
0.654**

(0.002)
0.692**

(0.033)

(0.028)
0.050
(0.042)

(0.042)
0.005
(0.005)

(0.039)
0.010
(0.012)

(0.017)
0.002
(0.018)

0.706**

0.025
(0.044)
0.002

-0.003
(0.006)
0.735**

-0.003
(0.014)
0.807**

-0.017
(0.014)
0.660**

(0.068)
552
0.515

(0.059)
1592
0.547

(0.111)
1591
0.670

(0.093)
1582
0.668

(0.042)
1582
0.568

After

Age (child age)
Base outcome

c

(0.019) (0.002) (0.005)
0.735** 0.725** 0.671**
(0.058)

T1

(0.041)

(0.046)

d

T 2d
Constant

-0.072 0.718** 0.748**

Observations
R2

(0.087)
553
0.565

(0.106)
555
0.743

(0.108)
552
0.732

Notes: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, robust standard errors (in parentheses) were adjusted for clustering at the village level.
DID denotes difference in difference, T1 and T2 denotes treatment 1 and treatment 2 a DID=MaleT*After. b Outcomes
in natural logarithms. c Base outcome denotes the indicator of child nutritional status at baseline. d Excluded category
are control villages.

Next, we did several extensions and robustness checks. First, we re-estimated the
regressions of Tables 3 and 4 by raising the upper age limit from nine years of age to include
children ≤16 years old, and found no significant results (regressions not shown). Second, we
assessed whether the treatment might have had a stronger effect on children 2-5 years of age
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since mothers might be particularly important for the nutrition of pre-school age children (Navia
et al., 2003; Ovaskainen et al., 2009). We created an indicator variable for this age bracket
(child), and interacted it with all variables from equation [1]. To assess whether the triple
difference-in-difference estimate (MaleT*After*child) was significant, we ran the regression for
the pooled sample with all these interaction variables and found no significant effect for any
group (regressions not shown). Third, we assessed whether mothers and fathers skewed
investments differently between daughters and sons (Godoy et al., 2006c; Thomas, 1994). Using
the pooled sample, we interacted the child sex variable (boy) with all the variables of Tables 3
and 4, and assessed whether the triple interaction, MaleT*After*boy, was significant (Table 5).
We found no significant results. Fourth, we limited the analysis to households that directly
received the transfer from us rather than from third parties (Table 6) using the pooled sample,
and again found no significant results.
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Table 5. Triple difference-in-difference estimate of the differential effects of gender-targeted
income transfers on anthropometric indicators of nutritional status of boys versus girls,
controlling for baseline conditions (pooled sample)
Explanatory variables:
DID a
After
MaleT
Age (child age)
Boy (child sex)
Base outcome
T1
T2
DID*boy e
After*boy
MaleT*boy
Age *boy
Base outcome*boy
T1*boy
T2*boy
Constant
Observations
R2

WHZ

MUACb

AMAb

TSFb

0.079

0.003

0.004

0.033

(.077)
-0.107
(.056)
-0.065*
(.025)
0.011
(.009)
-0.049
(.091)
0.730 **
(0.047)
0.078
(0.047)
0.017
(0.051)
-0.066
(0.133)
0.022
(0.096)
0.055
(0.032)
0.009
(.015)
-0.026
(0.052)
-0.054
(0.067)
0.011
(.077)
0.029
(0.057)
1592
0.542

(0.008)
0.010
(0.006)
-0.006 *
(0.002)
0.010 **
(0.001)
0.026
(0.224)
0.719**
(0.037)
0.009
(0.005)
0.005
(0.005)
-0.005
(0.0148)
-0.010
(0.009)
0.003
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.004
(0.085)
-0.008
(0.005)
-0.015*
(0.006)
0.728**
(0.097)
1591
0.671

(0.025)
0.032
(0.018)
-0.016 *
(0.007)
0.030 *
(0.003)
0.001
(0.160)
0.644**
(0.028)
0.020
(0.013)
0.016
(0.012)
-0.015
(0.033)
-0.030
(0.021)
0.012
(0.010)
-0.003
(0.007)
0.014
(0.067)
-0.020
(0.015)
-0.034*
(0.015)
0.807**
(0.066)
1582
0.669

(0.033)
-0.029
(0.027)
-0.004
(0.009)
-0.003
(0.003)
0.014
(0.078)
0.684**
(0.024)
0.001
(0.020)
-0.014
(0.016)
-0.041
(0.044)
0.027
(0.029)
0.002
(0.012)
-0.010 *
(0.005)
0.005
(0.036)
0.002
(0.022)
-0.006
(0.022)
0.645**
(0.050)
1582
0.570

Notes: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, robust standard errors (in parentheses) were adjusted for clustering at the village
level. DID denotes difference in difference, T1 and T2 denotes treatment 1 and 2. a DID=MaleT*After. b In natural
logarithms. c Excluded category is control villages. d Base outcome denotes the indicator of child nutritional status
at baseline. e DID*boy=MaleT*After*boy.

21

Table 6. Difference-in-difference estimate of the effects of gender-targeted income transfers on
child anthropometric indicators of nutritional status, restricted to households that directly
received the transfer from researchers (pooled sample)
WHZ

MUACb

AMAb

TSFb

DID a

0.059
(0.075)

-0.006
(0.010)

-0.019
(0.027)

0.014
(0.037)

After

-0.083
(0.058)
-0.059**

0.007
(0.009)
-0.007

0.022
(0.024)
-0.013

-0.019
(0.035)
-0.011

(0.021)
0.025
(0.032)
0.022*
(0.009)

(0.003)
-0.011*
(0.005)
0.009**
(0.002)

(0.010)
-0.015
(0.010)
0.028**
(0.005)

(0.010)
-0.040**
(0.011)
-0.009**
(0.003)

T1

0.751**
(0.031)
0.085*

0.689**
(0.059)
0.006

0.634**
(0.055)
0.003

0.698**
(0.022)
0.023

T2

(0.041)
0.048

(0.006)
-0.006

(0.014)
-0.011

(0.022)
-0.013

(0.053)
-0.074
(0.057)
940
0.62

(0.008)
0.825**
(0.155)
943
0.64

(0.017)
0.863**
(0.128)
936
0.64

(0.016)
0.652**
(0.053)
936
0.57

Explanatory variables:

MaleT
Boy (child sex)
Age (child age)
Base outcome

Constant
Observations
R-squared

Notes: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, robust standard errors (in parentheses) were adjusted for clustering at the village
level. DID denotes difference in difference, T1 and T2 denotes treatment 1 and 2. a DID=MaleT*After. b In
natural logarithms. c Excluded category is control villages. d Base outcome denotes the indicator of child
nutritional status at baseline.

To test whether the transfers between female and male household heads were well
randomized, we ran separate regressions using treatment (MaleT) as the outcome variable and
the child’s age, sex, and anthropometric indicator as independent variables, for each of the four
groups and anthropometric indicators, considering only the baseline year. In all but one of the
regressions all the individual coefficients and the overall F statistic were not significant at the
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95% confidence interval, suggesting that the assignment of the treatments between female and
male household heads was well randomized (regressions not shown).
Although the rate of child attrition was low (4.7%), we examined whether attrition could
have driven the results. We regressed the raw anthropometric measures (outcome variables)
against MaleT, child’s sex and age, T1 and T2, a discrete indicator variable for attrition, and a
vector of interaction variables of the attrition indicator variable with all the above explanatory
variables. F tests for the joint significance of the interaction of the attrition variable with all the
explanatory variables were never significant (regressions not shown).

4. Discussion
We found no effects of one-time, unconditional in-kind income transfers on child
nutritional status, and no differential effect by whether the female or the male household head
received the transfers. Here we discuss possible explanations for these results and implications of
the study.
The lack of effects may be partially explained by the low income elasticities of nutrient
consumption (Behrman and Deolalikar, 1989; Bouis, 1994; Bouis and Haddad, 1992) and by the
relatively good anthropometric indicators of nutritional status of Tsimane’ children at baseline
except for stunting; quite possibly Tsimane’ do not perceive their children to be short because
their reference is their community, not international standards (Godoy et al., 2010a). Further, the
transfers may have been inadequate to improve nutritional quality. Research on the dietary
correlates of early childhood growth in the developing world, including South American
populations, has shown that measures of dietary quality (i.e., nutrient density), such as percent of
dietary energy/protein from animal foods, and amount of animal protein consumed are stronger
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predictors of physical growth patterns than overall intakes of energy or protein (Allen, 1993,
2003; Leonard et al., 1995, 2000). Consequently, even though the transfers likely increased total
energy availability at the household level, that they may not have directly increased dietary
quality may have limited their potential impact on children. These three qualifications might
explain why we found no significant direct effects, but would not explain the absence of
differential effects on child nutritional status by the parent receiving the transfer.
Intra-household resource allocation depends on the specific social norms of a community.
We focus on three possible explanations which may affect the outcomes and results of the study:
resource pooling within the household and common household decision-making, shared
preferences, and equal bargaining power between female and male household heads.
Unlike physical assets, over which Tsimane’ have well-defined private property rights,
with food resources Tsimane’ have an open-access policy of allowing any person in the
household to consume the food. Tsimane’ horticulture requires cooperation. Men cut the large
trees for farming, but thereafter women and men work jointly clearing the underbrush, burning,
planting, weeding, and harvesting. Both have equal rights to the farm plots and equal say on the
end uses of the harvest, including bartering or selling crops. There is no gendered division in
food products, and no restrictions on access to food (except for food taboos during specific
periods in the life cycle). Wildlife and harvested crops are pooled and food crops are stored in
the house, available for any person in the household. Furthermore, although women or older unmarried daughters take primary responsibilities for cooking, the food is placed in an open pot for
all people to eat directly, or dished out. In sum, we might not observe differences in child
nutritional status in relation to the parent who received the transfer because the food would have
been accessible for all people in the household to eat.
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The impact of the transfers might have been attenuated by leakages through gifts or
reciprocal exchanges to other households. Households gave away 11% of the edible rice
received, while control households gave away 3% of the transfer. Households maintain their own
food stocks, but will cook and eat from communal pots, and often share a kitchen with the
extended family. Tsimane’ are less likely to share uncooked food, except at the end of the rainy
season (January-April) when stocks of rice dwindle and the new crop has yet to be harvested. At
this point those with extra rice might share it with their neighbors or extended family, but others
might rely primarily on plantains or might buy food in towns.
Because the Tsimane’ are a tightly-knit, small-scale endogamic society, it is not
surprising that Tsimane’ parents would share preferences about food consumption and child
rearing. Indirect evidence suggests that Tsimane’ share many traits, such as ethno-botanical
knowledge (Reyes-Garcia et al., 2003), and practice positive assortative mating for age,
schooling, body size and type, ethno-botanical knowledge, and psychological traits (Godoy et al.,
2008). We found almost no significant gender differences in the amount of rice allocated to
barter, sale, gifts to others, or that they had in storage at the time of the follow-up survey.
However, women reported allocating 25% more rice to direct consumption than men (t=4.15;
p=0.001), most likely because women cook and keep closer tabs on rice stocks.
Last, we might have observed no differential impact on child nutritional status if women
and men were equally empowered (Basu, 2006; Gitter and Barham, 2008; Smith et al., 2003). In
an earlier study (Godoy et al., 2006b) we found that women saw themselves as the major
decision makers and tie breakers when spouses could not reach an agreement in various
economic domains of the household economy (e.g., buying or selling goods, child schooling),
except with decisions about wage labor and the purchase of commercial alcoholic beverages.
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Equality in the ownership of traditional wealth and stocks of domesticated animals, and a wide
support of kin may explain female empowerment. A person’s fallback position when cooperation
fails is thought to play a major role in empowerment (Agarwal, 1997; Behrman and Rosenzweig,
2006; McElroy, 1990).
Our results have at least one policy implication. If other societies resemble the Tsimane’
in resource pooling, sharing of preferences, and female empowerment, then targeting transfers to
women might not affect investments in children. Gender targeting not only has equity
implications but may also raise implementation costs or produce gender-based conflicts (Hidrobo
and Fernald, 2012). The absence of large effects on child nutritional status raises the questions of
whether larger transfers, more frequent transfers, or conditionality would be required to have
measureable impact on child nutritional status. A systematic review comparing the effect of
conditionality of income transfers on educational outcomes suggests that while conditional and
unconditional cash transfers improved schooling outcomes, these improvements were always
larger with conditionality (Baird et al., 2013).
The results shown also raise concerns about the potential limits of standard economic and
modern human capital indicators to infer intra-household bargaining power and female
empowerment. Researchers typically estimate the gap or ratio in earnings, asset wealth, or
human capital between female and male household heads to make inferences about the degree of
female empowerment (Gitter and Barham, 2008). If applied to the Tsimane’, the approach would
lead one to the conclusion that adult women lacked bargaining power compared with men. What
we find, instead, is that female empowerment seems to reflect not only access to some material
resources, but also harder-to-measure social norms.
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5. Conclusion
To conclude, in this highly autarkic and relatively egalitarian society, large one-time
gender-targeted unconditional income transfers produced no discernible impact on short-run
nutritional status of children. The trial did not allow us to identify the mechanisms for the null
finding, but ethnographic research and panel data suggest that specific social norms of the
community, such as pooling of resources, shared preferences, and female empowerment might
be plausible explanations. The null findings are in accord with the predictions of a unitary
household model with common preferences and constraints (Behrman, 1997). More importantly,
our results highlight the probable importance of culture in determining household decisionmaking and resource allocation, and raises questions about the belief that income in the hands of
women benefits young children more than income in the hands of men.
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